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For some years now, courts and commentators have been wres-
tling, inconclusively, with problems arising out of transfers of "con-
trolling" blocks of shares of publicly held corporations. In the typical
situation, the holder of such a block-sometimes a majority but often
the largest single minority interest in the corporation-sells his shares
privately at a price higher than the current market price and, as part
of the arrangement, agrees to procure the resignation of all or a major-
ity of the existing directors and their replacement by designees of the
buyer.
There are two questions. First, can the seller keep the premium
over market price which he receives for his shares, or should he pay all
or part of it over to the corporation or the other shareholders? Second,
is it appropriate to replace all or a majority of the directors without
a vote of the shareholders?
Some of these transfers of control have been attacked in the
courts.' Judge Friendly noted that they often result in serious injury
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University,
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1966-68.
1 The most picked-over case on the premium issue is Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). For early pickings, see Berle, "Control"
in Corporate Law, 58 COLUMN. L. REv. 1212 (1958); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70
HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF, L. Rav. 1
(1956). Later ruminations include Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportu-
nity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv. L. R y. 505 (1965); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of
Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 420 (1965).
The substitution-of-directors issue was most thoroughly worked over by the Second
Circuit in Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). The ramifications
were further explored in New York cases involving the activities of Victor Muscat and
his associates with respect to Lionel Corporation and Republic Corporation. Matter of
Lionel Corp., 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 24, at 14, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 4, 1964), affd sub nom.
Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 801, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 14
N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964); Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance
Indus., Inc., 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 119, at 13, col. 8 (Sup. Ct., June 17, 1964), aff'd mem., 23
App. Div. 2d 630, 257 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1964); Matter of Carter, 151 N.Y.L.J. No.
103, at 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct., May 26, 1964), afJ'd sub nom. Carter v. Muscat, 21 App. Div.
2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't 1964). These cases are fully described and imaginatively
analyzed in Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 COMELL L.Q. 49 (1965).
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to public shareholders. 2 Legal attacks, however, have generally been
unsuccessful, and the courts and commentators have been unable to
develop adequate standards to deal with either problem.8
The proxy rules4 adopted by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 have,
over the past thirty-four years, been instrumental in producing a high
level of disclosure about matters submitted to shareholders for their
consideration. The impact of these rules was greatly broadened by the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,6 which not only extended the
rules to certain unlisted as well as listed companies but also made
them applicable to all shareholder meetings, including those for which
the corporation did not solicit proxies.
Under the proxy rules, shareholders must be furnished with in-
formation about nominees for election as directors prior to the election
meeting, whether or not proxies are solicited 7 and whether or not the
nominees have previously been elected by the shareholders., Special
rules prescribe the information to be furnished when there is a contest
for seats on the board.9 However, when a "controlling" block of shares
is sold, and the agreement provides that the seller will procure the
resignations of all or a majority of the existing directors and their
replacement by designees of the buyer, not only do the other share-
holders have no chance to vote on the new directors, but up to now
there has been no requirement that they be told about the transfer
of control until it has actually taken place, and no information about
the new directors had to be supplied to them until the next annual
meeting. This is so despite the fact that many of these transactions in-
volve complex financial arrangements between the buyer and seller
or with third parties which are precisely the types of arrangements
about which shareholders should be fully informed.
The reason that the proxy rules have been inapplicable in these
situations is the provision found in most state laws which permits
the directors to fill vacancies on the board in the period between
annual meetings. The provision has generally been interpreted as
permitting the entire board to resign seriatim at the direction of the
2 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion).
3 See articles cited in note 1 supra.
4 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 et seq. (1968).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
6 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2 (1968).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Item 6 (1968).
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1968).
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old "controlling" shareholder and to select designees of the new
"controlling" shareholder to fill their places. This line of interpreta-
tion is probably an unwarranted extension of the original intent of
these provisions, but there is no reasonable prospect at the present
time that it will be reversed or that state laws will be amended to
rectify the situation. Illinois is the only state that clearly requires
a shareholder vote in these circumstances;10 the Delaware law, which
was previously unclear, was amended in 1961 so that it now clearly
permits the directors to select their replacements." The American Bar
Foundation's Model Business Corporation Act, patterned largely on
the Illinois Act, departs from its model in this respect by providing
that "[a]ny vacancy occurring in the board of directors may be filled
by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors though
less than a quorum .... ,112 The explanation is that this "enables a
corporation to have a full board without the expense and delay in-
cident to holding a special meeting of shareholders."' 3
The federal proxy rules serve as an adjunct to state corporation
laws by assuring that shareholders have adequate information when
asked to give their proxies to vote on actions for which state law re-
quires their consent. The impact of the rules, however, goes consider-
ably further. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 made the proxy
rules applicable to all meetings of shareholders, even when no proxies
were solicited,14 and the Supreme Court held in 1964 that shareholders
had a right under federal law to enjoin a transaction approved by the
10 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, § 157.36 (1965). An earlier provision requiring directors to
fill vacancies in the board of directors was held to violate ILL. CoNsr. art. XI, § 3. People
v. Cohn, 839 II. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930). For a summary of state provisions, see ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 36, 2.01-2.03 (1960).
11 Delaware law permits directors to fill vacancies on the board, except that if the
remaining directors constitute less than a majority of the whole board, the Court of
Chancery, upon application of the holders of 10% of the shares, can order a meeting of
shareholders to elect new directors to replace those selected by the board. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 223 (Supp. 1968). Before 1961, it was unclear whether the provision for an election
by shareholders could be evaded by having the directors resign seriatim instead of as a
group. In 1961, the statute was amended to add a provision that when one or more
directors resign from the board, effective at a future date, a majority of the directors
then in office, including those who have so resigned, have power to fill the vacancies.
53 Del. Laws ch. 168, § 3 (1961), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
This amendment in effect nullified any possibility that a shareholder vote could be re-
quired when a majority of the directors resigns in connection with a transfer of a control-
ling block of shares.
12 ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. Aar ANN. § 36 (1960).
13 Id. at 4.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1964).
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vote of proxies solicited in violation of the proxy rules,15 It does not
seem appropriate, therefore, that the operation of these rules, which
serve an important informative and prophylactic function even when
considered apart from the proxy solicitations to which they were orig-
inally tied, should be limited by anomalous provisions of state law.
In March and April of 1967, the Subcommittee on Securities of
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held three days of
hearings on a bill introduced by Senator Williams of New Jersey to
regulate take-over bids (either through public tender offers or private
or open market purchases) and corporate repurchases of their own
securities. 16 This bill was generally noteworthy as one of the first sys-
tematic attempts to deal with public offers to purchase-as distin-
guished from public offers to sell-securities. But, as originally pro-
posed, it was not directed at transfers of large blocks of shares by the
person or group currently controlling the corporation. 17
In its statement to the subcommittee in support of the bill, the
Securities and Exchange Commission suggested a number of changes.
One of these was the addition of a new subsection (f) to section 14
of the 1934 Act, providing that if, in connection with any transfer of
more than ten per cent of the outstanding shares of a corporation,
there is any arrangement or understanding by which a majority of
the directors are to be changed without a vote of shareholders, the
corporation must file with the SEC and send to its shareholders, before
any of the new directors are installed, information substantially equiv-
alent to that which would have to be filed and sent if those persons
were nominees for election as directors at a meeting of shareholders.' 8
15 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16 Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
17 It did contain a provision requiring any person, or group of persons, who acquires
more than 10% of the shares of a publicly-held company to send to the issuer and to the
SEC, within seven days after the acquisition, a statement setting forth certain information
about the person making the acquisition, the source of his funds, any plans he may have
for major changes in the company's business or corporate structure, the number of shares
he owns, and any contracts, arrangements or understandings with any other person regard-
ing the securities of the company. Hearings, supta note 16, at 4-5. This provision was
retained in the bill as finally enacted, except that the deadline for filing the statement
was extended to ten days after the acquisition. S. Ras,. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13
(1967). It does not, however, require prior notification to anyone of the transfer of a
controlling block of shares, or a change in the board of directors, and does not require any
information to be sent to shareholdes even after the event.
18 Hearings, supra note 16, at 25-26, 37, 39-40.
In a subsequent proceeding before the Commission involving failure to file required
reports covering transactions with persons who took over a majority of the seats on the
board after purchase of a controlling stock interest, the Commission stated:
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The proposal drew no comment from the other witnesses who testified
on the bill, other than a "no objection" from the New York Stock
Exchange, 9 It was incorporated without change in the bill reported
out by the Banking and Currency Committee on August 29, 1967,20
and signed into law by the President on July 29, 1968.21
This new section 14(f) does have some built-in limitations. It
extends only to corporations already subject to the proxy rules, thus
excluding in general corporations having fewer than 500 shareholders
or less than one million dollars in assets. And it does not reach the situa-
tions where a transfer of effective control is achieved by a change of
less than a majority of the board22 or by a sale of less than ten per cent
of the outstanding shares.2 Within these limitations, however, it will
elicit effective and timely disclosure of the important facts about the
transaction,
A disclosure requirement is obviously not the equivalent of a
requirement that the new directors be elected by a vote of the share-
holders. Nevertheless in many situations the disclosure may be more
Where, as here, a majority of directors resigns within 11 days of a transfer of
controllipg blocks of stock, it is most important to the public stockholders that
they obtain at the least prompt information with respect to the charges that have
taken place. Indeed, to be fully effective, detailed information as to such changes
should be given to stockholders before they are actually consummated, so that
stockholders will be aware that a material alteration in the managerial structure
of their company is about to take place and they will be alerted to the possible
impact of the changes on their investment interests and be in a better position
to take steps to protect those interests. Such disclosure would among other things
make more difficult the concealment of transactions for the benefit of a controlling
person of the type that occurred in the present case.
Matter of Crescent Corporation, SEc. Ex. AcT. oF 1934 R.L. No. 8200, at 1 (Dec, 4, 1967).
19 Hearings, supra note 16, at 93.
20 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
21 82 Stat. 454 (United States Code Cong. & Adm. News at 2767, Aug. 25, 1968).
22 At the annual meeting of Old Town Corp. in July 1967, a group headed by Roy
M, Cohn, which had bought from the family of the former head of the company 19% of
the shares and options to buy and proxies to vote an additional 26%, elected 6 representa-
tives to the 14-member board. Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1967, at 13, col. 3.
23 Section 14() is limited by its terms to changes in the board pursuant to transac-
tions which are subject to § 13(d) or 14(d) of the Act. These sections, which are the basic
provisions of 82 Stat. 454 (United States Code Cong. & Adm. News at 2767, Aug. 25, 1968),
generally apply only to transactions involving more than 10% of a class of shares. However,
where less than 10% of the shares are transferred, the courts may set aside the substitution
of directors on the ground that "the management of a corporation ... cannot be bought
apart from actual stock control." Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 303, 246
N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1964) (setting aside replacement of directors in connection with a sale of 3% of the
outstanding shares). But cf. Matter of Carter, 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 103, at 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.,
May 26, 1964), aff'd sub nom. Carter v. Muscat, 21 App. Div. 2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Ist




significant than the voting right. For example, if the controlling share-
holder has a majority of the voting shares, the vote is a mere formality;
only the disclosure is significant. And even if he does not have a
majority, but the remaining shareholders are widely scattered and
have no effective voting power, the principal significance of state law
voting requirements at present may still be their effect in triggering
the operation of federal disclosure requirements under the proxy rules.
Nor does a disclosure requirement operate as a direct control on
the price a controlling shareholder may charge for his shares or the
persons to whom he can sell them. But if the terms of the disclosed
transaction are offensive enough, any shareholder has the right to seek
an injunction or other appropriate relief. It is important, however, that
the information be sent to shareholders before the new directors are
installed, so that shareholders will have greater leverage in attempting
to prevent an unfair transaction. 4 A court will be more sympathetic
to a shareholder seeking to enjoin a proposed transfer of control than
one seeking to set aside a consummated transfer.
Finally, no disclosure provision can provide an answer to the basic
substantive question: Under what conditions and on what terms may
the shareholder or shareholders who control a publicly held corporation
turn over that control to another? That question, however, cannot be
dealt with until we decide whether there is anything wrong if someone
who owns a majority-or thirty per cent or perhaps even fifteen per
cent-of the voting stock of a publicly owned corporation exercises
complete control over that corporation's policies through his power to
select the board of directors. The implications of that inquiry deserve
more extended treatment.
24 The temporary rules and regulations adopted by the SEC require that the informa-
tion called for by section 14(f) be filed with the Commission and sent to shareholders not
less than 10 days before the new directors take office. SEc. Ex. AcT or 1934 RE. No. 8370,
at 4 (July 30, 1968).
